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One premise p materially implies a conclusion q if, and only if, it is not the case that both p is 
true and q is false in a given world that is assumed as a parameter. This is a relation of 
material implication. This reference to a parameter world is justified by the fact that when we 
evaluate arguments that contain a material implication in the premise we consider all the 
possible worlds in which the premise is true. The set of these possible worlds might include 
the actual world, but it doesn’t need to be restricted by it. The relation of formal implication 
is slightly different. One premise p formally implies a conclusion q if, and only if, it is not the 
case that p is true and q is false in any possible world.  
We can say then that in a material implication the relation of logical consequence is 
restricted to a parameter world, whereas in a formal implication the relation of logical 
consequence is unrestricted and extends over many worlds. One could infer from these 
similarities that the material implication should be reduced to formal implication with the 
argument that it is just a restricted version of it, or, inversely, that formal implication should 
be reduced to material implication with the argument that it is an unrestricted version of it. 
But both reductionist claims would betray a superficial understanding of this connection. The 
obvious kinship between material and formal implication just means that they express the 
same type of implication. If they seem any different is because they differ in scope. 
One way to talk about this difference is to maintain that formal and material implication 
are the same type of implication presented in two degrees. In the first degree, we have what is 
usually referred to as the relation of material implication, which is restricted by a parameter 
world. In the second degree, we have what is known as a relation of formal implication, 
which ensures that in every possible world in which their premises are true, their truth is 
preserved. The important thing is that the same pattern of implication presented in first 
degree is repeated in the second degree.  
Let’s use ‘1•’ and ‘2•’ to represent first and second degrees. We can put this degree 
distinction into practice by evaluating a simple argumentative form such as modus ponens: p 
⊃ q, p ⊨ q. This argumentative form can be interpreted as claiming that that in every possible 
world in which p 1•implies q and p is true, q is also true. Or, to put it more simply, the truth of 
(p ⊃ q)&p 2•implies q. The 2•implication is a 1•implication repeated across different worlds. 
It is the same process, only with a different modal reach.   
Conditional sentences are claims to a deductive inference, which means that the assertion 
of a conditional contains the implicit claim that the antecedent (or premise) necessitates the 
consequent (or conclusion) relatively to the parameter world. The fact that the claim to a 
necessitation relation is restricted to a given world does not alter the dynamic. Conditionals 
are arguments, not connectives. If they happen to be used in arguments, it’s because we make 
arguments that involve arguments either as a premise or a conclusion, or both. The argument 
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that uses an argument as a premise or a conclusion is a 2•implication, but the argument that is 
used either as a premise or a conclusion is a 1•implication.  
Let’s consider the first paradox of material implication, i.e., the argumentative form ¬p ⊨ 
p ⊃ q. One apparent counterexample to this argumentative form is ‘Some John did not drink 
poison. Therefore, if John drinks poison, it will be good for his health’. Intuitively, the 
conclusion is false. But let’s analyse this argumentative form using the present heuristic. The 
first paradox can be interpreted as claiming that that in every possible world in which ¬p is 
true, p 1•implies q. Or, to use a different description, the truth of ¬p 2•implies p ⊃  q. The 
conclusion of the argument seems false if we conceive a world where p is true, but this modal 
intuition is motivated by poor reasoning. This way of thinking ignores that 1•implications are 
always restricted to a world parameter, and the world parameters in this case are worlds 
where p is false, not true. It would be as if we would determine whether a premise p&¬p 
2•implied q by considering worlds where p&¬p is true knowing that this premise is 
necessarily false.  
Notice that the present distinction is also important because it allows what is usually 
referred to as a material implication ‘to travel’ between different worlds. I say this because 
for some strange reason people assume that material implications are confined in the actual 
world and that only possible world theories are allowed to make use of modal intuitions, and 
these are the only correct ones. The limits of this point of view become clear when we 
consider the evaluation of a simples modus tollens argument. In these cases there are no 
possible worlds where both p → q and ¬q are true, but ¬p is false. But all the possible worlds 
in this evaluation are worlds where p → q and ¬q are both true, are also worlds where ¬p is 
also true. Otherwise, the first conditional would contain a true premise and a false conclusion. 
Thus, the only meaningful way to make sense of a simple modus tollens argument is to 
abandon possible world theories. This shows that the conventional wisdom on the subject 
needs revision: it’s the material implication (or first degree implication) that is flexible, and 
not the conditionals in possible world theories. 
The main lesson we should learn from the present criticism is that the usual presentation 
in logic textbooks of the material implication (or, if we decide to use the more usual term, 
‘material conditional’) as a form of connective is completely misguided. This probably will 
help us explain why the counter-intuitive aspects of the material implication and the 
perplexities surrounding conditionals in general seem much deeper and resilient than the 
weird features of truth-functional connectives such as disjunction and conjunction. The 
material implication is not a connective, but a deductive argument with a restriction to a 
parameter. Consequently, the current terminology that relies on a distinction between material 
implication and formal implication should be replaced by a distinction between first and 
second degree implications.
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